We revisit the debate on the optimal number o …rms in the commons in a di¤erential oligopoly game in which …rms are either quantityor price-setting agents. Production exploits a natural resource and involves a negative externality. We calculate the number of …rms maximising industry pro…ts, …nding that it is larger in the Cournot case. While industry structure is always ine¤cient under Bertrand behaviour, it may or may not be so under Cournot behaviour, depending on parameter values. The comparison of private industry optima reveals that the Cournot steady state welfare level exceeds the corresponding Bertrand magnitude if the weight of the stock of pollution is large enough.
Introduction
The usual approach to the economics of the environment treats externalities and the extraction of natural resources separately, and in the latter case compares open access (or equivalently, perfect competition) against monopoly. 1 Here we propose a uni…ed approach to the two aspects of the industrial exploitation of the environmen, using a homogeneous good oligopoly in which …rms may set either quantities or prices to maximise pro…ts, and their productive activities require the use of a renewable resource and emit pollutants. Each of these two aspects has indeed received attention in the literature, either in static or in dynamic oligopoly models, 2 but, to the best of our knowledge, the joint analysis of resource extraction and pollution has not. Our analysis will abstract from the possibility of regulating …rms' interaction via Pigouvian taxation/subsidization 3 and/or pollution rights, 4 to focus on the issue of the optimal number of …rms in the commons. This problem lies at the intersection between the well known discussion about the tragedy of the commons (Gordon, 1954; Hardin, 1968) and the standard approach to the entry process belonging to the theory of industrial organization (Novshek, 1980; Suzumura and Kiyono, 1987; Mankiw and Whinston, 1990) . The backbone of this discussion is the fact that, while in absence of any external e¤ects increasing competition (and therefore industry output) increases welfare, if industrial activities exploit natural resources and/or imply the emission of pollutants then the socially optimal degree of concentration of such an industry is determined by the balance between the price e¤ect and the environmental one (Cornes and Sandler, 1983; Cornes, Mason and Sandler, 1986; Karp, 1992; Mason and Polasky, 1997) . We revisit this issue in a di¤erential game in which we assess the privately optimal structure (maximising industry pro…ts) against the socially optimal industry structure (maximising social welfare), given the pro…t-maximising behaviour of …rms, under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. Industry structure is always socially ine¢ cient under Bertrand behaviour, while it may or may not be so under Cournot behaviour, depending on the environment's e¢ ciency in ab-sorbing pollution. Then, we establish that (i) the privately optimal structure in Cournot exceeds its counterpart in Bertrand, and consequently (ii) social welfare in the private optimum can be higher at the Cournot equilibrium, if the weight of pollution in the social welfare function is su¢ ciently high.
The basic model is laid out in section 2. The non-cooperative equilibrium between pro…t-maximizing …rms is outlined in section 3. Section 4 contains the analysis of the social planning equilibrium. The two regimes are comparatively assessed in section 5, while the mixed setting is investigated in section 6. Concluding remarks are in section 7.
The setup
Consider an oligopoly market over an in…nite (continuous) time horizon, t 2 [0; 1) ; in which n 2 …rms supply a homogeneous good, whose market demand function is
at any time t 2 [0; 1) ; with a > 0 being a positive constant parameter measuring the reservation price and Q (t) = P n i=1 q i (t) being the sum of all …rms'output levels. Production takes place at decreasing returns to scale, with the same technology being common to all …rms alike, so that …rm i's instantaneous cost function is C i (t) = cq 2 i (t) ; with the constant c > 0.
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The production of the …nal output goes along with a negative environmental externality whose instantaneous level is (t) = S 2 (t) =2; with > 0 and S (t) evolving over time according to the following dynamics:
where > 0 is the decay rate of the stock and b is a positive constant. The Instantaneous consumer surplus CS (t) is measured by the area below the demand function and above market price p (t) ; minus the externality (t): 5 We could have speci…ed the cost function as C i (t) = zq i (t) + cq 2 i (t) ; with z > 0: This would be a useless complication, however, as one could as well think of the vertical intercept of the demand function as a = b a z; whereby the ensuing analysis would reproduce unmodi…ed.
It is worth noting that a contraction of output has ambiguous consequences over consumer surplus, due to the presence of a negative externality proportional to the output: on the one hand, shrinking output goes along with increasing market price, which is harmful; on the other hand, it entails reducing the environmental externality, which is desirable. The balance between these components will play a key role in the remainder of the analysis.
Additionally, the production of the …nal good makes use of a renewable natural resource whose stock X (t) follows the state equation:
with constants and v strictly positive.
The instantaneous social welfare function, de…ned as the sum of industry pro…ts and consumer surplus, writes as follows:
In the remainder of the paper, we investigate the non-cooperative unregulated open-loop game where …rms compete either à la Cournot-Nash or à la Bertrand, alternatively, to maximise individual pro…ts. In both cases, …rm i chooses its strategy (either quantity or price) to maximise the discounted individual pro…t ‡ow:
s.t. the state equations (2) and (4), and the initial conditions S (0) = S 0 and X (0) = X 0 : Parameter > 0 represents the constant discount rate common to all …rms in the industry.
Proposition 1. The game among pro…t-maximising …rms is a linear state one, and therefore its open-loop Cournot-Nash solution is strongly time consistent.
Proof. The current value Hamiltonian of …rm i is:
where i (t) and i (t) are the co-state variables associated with the dynamics of pollution and the natural resource, respectively. The following system illustrates the set of …rst order conditions on controls and the associated co-state equations (omitting henceforth the time argument for brevity):
where Q i P j6 =i q j is the amount of instantaneous output collectively supplied by all rivals of …rm i at any given time. Clearly, (8-10) jointly imply that the optimal output of …rm i never depends on the states. The intuitive reason is that …rms -being unregulated pro…t maximising entitiesare completely uninterested in the amount of pollution and the stock of the resource and consequently behave as if the two-sided tragedy of commons did not exist. From a strictly technical standpoint, one can easily check that
and therefore the game is indeed a linear state one (cf. Dockner et al., 2000, p. 188) , yielding a subgame perfect or strongly time consistent Nash equilibrium under the open-loop information structure.
Accordingly, from (10) one obtains i = 0 for all i = 1; 2; 3; :::N at any time during the game. Then, from (8), one …nds
Then, di¤erentiating w.r.t. time, imposing symmetry across quantities (q j = q i = q for all i; j) and using (9), the control equation obtains:
Imposing stationarity, we have q CN = a= (n + 1 + 2c) ; which coincides with the solution of the static game. Superscript CN stands for Cournot-Nash. Of course the same solution obtains immediately by observing that the system of co-state equations (9-10) admits the solution i = i = 0 for all i = 1; 2; 3; :::N at all times, whereby the …rst order condition (8) indeed delivers q CN = a= (n + 1 + 2c) throughout the game. Before proceeding any further, we brie ‡y evaluate the stability properties of the dynamic system (2-4-14), by looking at the associated Jacobian matrix: 
whose eigenvalues are
6 This also implies that i = 0 for all i throughout the game, as is easily veri…ed from (13). Thus, the transversality conditions Accordingly, we can state:
Proposition 2. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the open-loop game is a saddle point.
The corresponding amount of pollution and the residual volume of natural resource obtain, respectively, from S = 0 and X = 0:
From the above expressions we can draw: Lemma 3. Since
open access implies positive and …nite volumes of resource and pollution at the steady state.
In particular, the second of the above limits reveals that open access does not lead to resource extinction.
The per-…rm pro…ts and social welfare in steady state are
The above expression reveals the following result. Lemma 4. The condition > b r n n + 2 (1 + c)
CN SW
7 Then, one can also easily show that the feedback equilibrium based upon the linear value function V i (S; X) = ! 1 + ! 2 S + ! 3 X and the corresponding Bellman equation
su¢ ces to ensure that the steady state social welfare level of the Cournot game be positive. That is, if the rate of absorption of pollutants is high enough, then social welfare cannot fall below zero. The critical threshold highlighted in Lemma 4 is clearly increasing in both b and ; i.e., the parameters measuring the marginal contribution of industry output to the accumulation of pollution, and the weight of the stock of pollutants in the composition of welfare.
The Bertrand-Nash game
Here we deal with the price competition case. The Hamiltonian of …rm i is de…ned as in (7), and as usual pro…t-seeking …rms do not internalise the external e¤ects of their strategies. Hence, also in the Bertrand case the openloop equilibrium will be strongly time consistent, and will replicate forever the equilibrium of the static one-shot game. There remains to characterise the equilibrium price behaviour of …rms at the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. To perform this task, we will rely on Dastidar (1995) , that has established what follows.
According to Dastidar (1995) , if the cost function (common to all …rms) features decreasing returns to scale, as is the case in the present model, then the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium is necessarily non-unique. In particular, the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is characterised by both …rms setting the same price p BN , which is bounded by two thresholds, p
The lower bound p avc (as the superscript indicates) equals average variable costs, so that at p avc …rms will be indi¤erent between either producing the output solving p avc = a nq
or producing nothing at all. The upper bound p u (with superscript u standing for undercutting) is the price at which …rms are indi¤erent between choosing price p u , and marginally undercutting it in order to capture the entire market demand at p u . The value of p avc is given by solving (23) w.r.t. q:
which delivers q = a= (c + n) and then substituting the latter into the demand function to obtain:
The upper bound to the equilibrium price, p u ; obtains by imposing indi¤er-ence between the symmetric oligopoly pro…ts:
and the monopoly pro…ts generated by undercutting:
Imposing O = M we obtain the following:
which can be plugged into the demand function to identify
As a matter of curiosity, one can equate the inverse demand function to marginal cost, then solve for q and …nally substitute the resulting output back into the demand function, to obtain marginal cost pricing:
where, obviously, superscript mc stands for marginal cost pricing. The continuum of Nash equilibria can be represented by the following expression:
Parameter represents the relative intensity of price competition between …rms. Note that, when = 0; the equilibrium price p BN equals average variable cost; = 1 corresponds to the case in which price equals marginal cost, while at = 4=3 the price attains the highest level above which undercutting takes place. As a consequence, we impose the restriction 2 [0; 4=3] : Using (31), the individual output and pro…ts write, respectively, as follows:
Using (32), we can solve S = 0 and X = 0 to obtain the steady state levels of pollution and the natural resource:
It is worth noting that the limits of S BN and X BN coincide with those of the corresponding magnitudes generated by Cournot behaviour.
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The associated level of social welfare is:
The above expression immediately shows the following. Lemma 5. The condition
> b p BN SW
su¢ ces to ensure that the steady state social welfare level of the Bertrand game be positive. Since n n + 2 (1 + c) < 1
for all n 2 and c > 0; the threshold emerging from the Cournot game is lower than the one characterising the Bertrand setting.
The second-best Industry structure
Here we focus on the issue of the optimal number of …rms in the commons. We set out by checking that the industry structure maximising industry pro…ts in the steady state of the Cournot model solves
in n CN = 2c + 1; so that n CN 2 for all c 1=2; otherwise n CN = 1 and industry pro…ts are maximised in monopoly. Suppose indeed c 1=2. If so, we can assess the social (in)e¢ ciency of the privately optimal number of …rms n CN by substituting n CN = 1 + 2c into the …rst derivative of SW CN w.r.t. n; obtaining:
and the r.h.s. of (41) Now we turn our attention to the Bertrand case. Here, the number of …rms that maximises industry pro…ts n BN solves
for all c (4 ) (2 ) = > 1=2 for all 2 [0; 4=3] : Under this condition (that excludes the trivial monopoly case and ensures n 2 irrespective of the market variable being set), we can substitute n BN into the derivative of SW BN w.r.t. n; …nding
Since Lemma 5 establishes that > BN SW = b p in order for SW BN > 0; we can state:
Proposition 7. Take c (4
We may sum up this discussion in the following terms. Provided is large enough to ensure that social welfare is positive at the steady state of both games, Propositions 6 and 7 jointly convey a message telling that, while under quantity-setting behaviour the privately optimal number of …rms may be higher or lower than the socially optimal one, depending on market size and the environment's e¢ ciency in absorbing pollution, under price-setting behaviour we have the unambiguous result that a benevolent planner would like to enlarge the population of …rms as compared to the privately optimal industry structure. An explanation of this result is sketched in the next section.
Prices vs quantities
The comparative assessment of the two settings can be carried out along several dimensions, the …rst being the relative size of n CN vs n BN : The expression n BN n CN is concave in , and
with c < 0 for all 2 [16=17; 4=3] and c + 0 for all 2 [1; 4=3] : Yet, c + < (4 ) (2 ) = for all admissible values of ; and consequently n BN < n CN except in the trivial case where both models only accomodate monopoly. The fact that Cournot behaviour allows for a larger population of …rms in correspondence of maximum industry pro…ts is de…nitely behind the result emerged from Propositions 6-7 above.
Consider now output levels, given a generic number of …rms. The di¤er-ence: q
is surely positive (i) for any n 2; if 2 [0; 1] ; (ii) for any 2 [0; 4=3] ; if n 3: Taking into account the integer problem and the constraint c (4 ) (2 ) = inherited from Proposition 7, the r.h.s. of (49) changes sign in the region identi…ed by n = 2 and 2 1; 9 p 17 =4 ; in which
If instead 2 9 p 17 =4; 4=3 , we have
and therefore q CN > q BN : Exactly the same conclusions apply for aggregate industry output and therefore also for the steady state levels of pollution and the natural resource, as the latter are, by the assumptions of the model, linear in the industry output. Hence, we may conclude that, taking n 2 as given (with the exception of the particular and circumscribed case identi…ed in (50)), pollution is lower under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition, due to the output restriction observed under pricesetting behaviour, which is generated by the presence of decreasing returns to scale. Exactly the opposite would intuitively apply if the marginal cost were constant, as in such a case the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium would coincide with perfect competition and consequently industry output would be higher than the Cournot-Nash one, with obvious consequences on industry pro…ts. However, by the same token, consumer surplus and the steady state volume of natural resource are both higher under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition.
A di¤erent exercise can be envisaged to compare the two industry output given their respective optimal industry structures n CN and n BN ; to evaluate the di¤erence
whose numerator is positive for all c > (and conversely), so that Q < 0 everywhere. 10 For the aforementioned reasons, this has in principle ambiguous consequences on welfare. Hence we must evaluate
In the special case = 0 (i.e., under average cost pricing under Bertrand behaviour), we have: 
with ( ) ; ( ) > 0; so that SW > 0 for all > ( ) = ( ). Accordingly, we may state: Proposition 8. In correspondence of the optimal industry structure n KN ; K = B; N , the steady state social welfare level is higher under Cournot behaviour for all admissible levels of ; if average cost pricing prevails in the Bertrand game. Otherwise, for positive values of ; steady state social welfare is higher under Cournot competition if is high enough.
Conclusions
We have analysed a di¤erential oligopoly game in which environmental externalities and the exploitation of natural resources combine in a single framework. Considering prices or quantities alternatively as the …rms' strategic instruments, we have assessed the privately optimal number of …rms against the socially optimal one, showing the emergence of an ambiguous conclusion in the Cournot setup. Conversely, under Bertrand behaviour the privately optimal degree of concentration is de…nitely too large from the social standpoint. Relatedly, taking as a benchmark the privately optimal industry structure, we have shown that the relative size of welfare levels at the steady states of the two models depends on the capability of the environment to absorb polluting emissions.
The foregoing analysis has been carried out assuming any form of regulation away. The study of the interplay between environmental policy, …rms' strategic behaviour and the (in)e¢ ciency of the resulting industry structure in the commons is left for future research.
